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The Role of Transport in Catching 
Up of New Member States
A közlekedés szerepe az új tagállamok 
felzárkózásában
New members joined the European Union in  2004 in the hope of catching up. One of 
the fields where new members are lagging is transport. After joining the EU, invest-
ments in transport infrastructure and transport equipment have risen remarkably, 
mainly due to EU funding. At the same time, GDP growth of new members has 
exceeded the EU average. This paper examines the connection between investment 
in transport and economic growth in the European Union focusing on the group of its 
Central and Eastern European new members. Direct effects of investments, indirect 
effects on productivity and welfare, as well as crowding in effects on further invest-
ments are considered. This paper aims to identify issues for further research and to 
give an outlook for the decade of the  2020s.
JEL codes: F43, H54, L91, O41, R42
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2004-ben és azt követően a felzárkózás reményében csatlakoztak új tagok az Európai 
Unióhoz. A közlekedés olyan terület, ahol az új tagok lemaradásban vannak a régiek-
hez képest. Az  EU-csatlakozást követően jelentősen nőttek a  közlekedési infra-
struktúrába és szállítási eszközökbe történt beruházások, főként EU-támogatással. 
Ugyanekkor az új tagok GDP-jének növekedése az EU-átlag felett volt. Ez a tanul-
mány a közlekedési célú beruházások és a gazdasági növekedés kapcsolatát vizsgálja 
az  Európai Unióban, az  új közép- és  kelet-európai tagokra összpontosítva. A  köz-
vetlen hatásokat, a  termelékenységre és  a  jólétre gyakorolt közvetett hatásokat, 
valamint a  további befektetések vonzását veszi tekintetbe. A  tanulmány igyekszik 
beazonosítani további kutatási kérdéseket, és kitekintést adni a  2020-as évekre. 
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1. Introduction
A group of Central and Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Repub-
lic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) joined 
the European Union between  2004 and  2013. These eleven countries (also referred to as 
the CEE11), regarding their tendencies of catching up to the EU average are in the focus. 
This paper does not deal with Cyprus and Malta also joining in  2004 because of their 
different geographic and historic features.
An unprecedented amount of investment has been directed towards the trans-
port sectors of the CEE countries, the main source being the EU funds provided in the 
 2007–2013 and  2014–2020 multiannual frameworks. Investments fuelled the relatively 
rapid economic growth. Effective absorption of these investments should appear in 
increasing productivity related to transport and in crowding in further investments 
through making the region and attractive location for investors. Some of these effects 
may be identified for the EU as whole, other factors may play a role in catching up of new 
members.
Besides productivity effects, welfare effects are also worth analysing. Economic 
growth enables increased consumption. Scrutinising the changing share of transport 
related elements of consumption patterns helps us to understand the complexity of 
the relationship between economic growth and transport development. The attitude of 
consumers in the new member states differs from the average EU citizen. For instance, 
people in Central and Eastern Europe tend to spend their additional income on personal 
cars. By using them, they cause bottlenecks making further investments in transport 
infrastructure necessary.
The Coronavirus had enormous effects on transport. International passenger 
transport has been paralysed. Some effects may last for years, the financial plans of the 
European Union addressing the economic consequences of the pandemic promise huge 
amounts of investments mostly financed by debt. By turning green and digital, these 
investments will have a different character compared to previous periods. Technological 
changes related to industry  4.0 also drive the demand for transportation in new direc-
tions.
2. Literature overview
Many authors have dealt with the effects of transport investments. Making one trans-
port connection between two points shorter and/or faster enables a transport company 
to carry more goods between two points by proportionally lower costs. Transport 
companies increase their productivity. Other companies benefit from lower transport 
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prices. The costs of transport development, the existence of transport networks, as well 
as social and environmental factors make the picture more complex.
Investments in transport infrastructure are mostly financed by state budget; some 
further investments in transport (for example, rolling stock) are often at least partially 
covered by tax revenues. Economists have been discussing long whether state invest-
ment ‘crowd out’ private investments. Sometimes, the same amount spent by private 
entities could bring more welfare. Concerning transport investments ‘crowding in’ are 
more often the case: better availability attracts private investors. Literature based on the 
U.S. experience also discusses ‘crowding out’ effects limited to the transport sector: pub-
lic investments discouraging private investors to build roads. In Europe this has little 
relevance. Agglomeration effects, a phenomenon often mentioned by the literature, may 
cause local concentration of investments and labour and abandoning other localities.
David Aschauer can be mentioned as a classical author on economic growth caused 
by infrastructure investment.1 He points on the productivity effect of new infrastruc-
ture on transport industry if bottleneck points are considered properly. This may lead to 
investments (of the transport companies), may lower production costs (of other indus-
tries). Johannes Bröcker and Piet Rietveld2 point on the high impacts of infrastructure 
development on construction material production and construction, later generating 
effects on maintenance activities and productivity of several sectors. Elena Cigu, Dan-
iela Agheorghiesei, Anca Gavriluță and Elena Toader emphasise the role (the quality) of 
public sector performance, warn not to look at the relationship between development 
and growth unidirectionally, and not to forget about sustainability.3
According to Tamás Fleischer, accelerating infrastructure development does not 
help economic boom.4 Infrastructure is important in securing economic stability, not 
growth. Functional infrastructural network and a balance between its development and 
its maintenance is a prerequisite for prosperity. He points on the strategic importance of 
infrastructure and the need to seek the harmony of various development goals including 
parallel improvement of several levels and modes of transport.
Scholars and empirical findings tend to let us see the growth effects of infra-
structure construction limited to a few years (the period of construction and the first 
years after completion). In case of the most developed countries and regions even neg-
ative correlation appears. Political decision-making and institutional imperfections of 
implementation are also more and more in the focus of analysis. Crowding in private 
investments and their impact on economic growth may be realised several years after 
the completion of a transport investment.
1 One of his relevant articles: David Alan Aschauer, ‘Highway capacity and economic growth’, Economic 
Perspectives  14, no 5 (1990),  14–24.
2 Johannes Bröcker and Piet Rietveld, ‘Infrastructure and development’, in Handbook of Regional 
Growth and Development Theories, ed. by Roberta Capello and Peter Nijkamp (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar,  2009)  152–189.
3 Elena Cigu, Daniela Tatiana Agheorghiesei, Anca Florentina Gavriluță (Vatamanu) and Elena Toader, 
‘Transport Infrastructure Development, Public Performance and Long-Run Economic Growth: A Case 
Study for the Eu-28 Countries’, Sustainability  11, no 67 (2019),  1–22.
4 Tamás Fleischer, ‘Infrastruktúra-fejlesztés és  gazdasági növekedés’, Vélemények, Kommentárok, 
Információk no 40 (2002),  1–2.
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Y Zeynep Elburz, Peter Nijkamp and Eric Pels performed a meta-analysis.5 They sum-
marised the findings of  42 studies. Only  45 per cent of these studies have proved positive 
correlation between infrastructure development and economic growth,  44 per cent even 
negative correlation,  11 per cent no clear relation. Most of the cases where construction 
of infrastructure did not cause economic growth (at least locally) were related to the U.S. 
Pavle Petrović, Milojko Arsić and Aleksandra Nojković have made an estimation of the 
marginal productivity of public investment in the CEE11 countries and found it higher 
than that in the EU15.6 Their study was not limited to infrastructure. Nebojša Stojčić, 
Zoran Aralica and Ivan-Damir Anić in their analysis of post crisis recovery of  56 NUTS 
regions in the CEE find infrastructure and knowledge diffusion being key factors of 
growth, foreign direct investments and digitalisation being the driving forces.7
In the case of Central and Eastern European member states of the European Union, 
marginal factor productivity of infrastructure construction has been found significantly 
positive by research. The outlook for the  2020s is similar but with some limitations. 
Investments focusing on bottlenecks and cross-border connections are still needed 
throughout the region. Issues like climate change and digitalisation will be intercon-
nected with the development. Well-founded political consideration will be needed. 
Daniel Albalate, Germà Bel and Xavier Fageda warn us: Spain with overcapacities is not 
an example to follow.8
3. Hypothesis
The general hypothesis of this paper is that a significant linkage between (1) the propor-
tionally higher investments in the transport infrastructure of the new EU members in 
the  2010s and (2) the higher than the EU average GDP growth can be proved based on 
the available data on investment, productivity and consumption.
Based on the  literature, this would mean that in Central and Eastern European 
member states of the EU: (a) further investments are ‘crowded in’ by transport related 
investments in new member states; (b) productivity of transport industry and produc-
tivity of using transport by other industries have improved more in the new member 
states than in the other EU countries; (c) transport related welfare effects of growth 
create further demand for transport in a sustainable way.
Apart from examining this hypothesis, some new tendencies of the  2020s are 
detected, modulating the importance of transport investments in the catching up pro-
cess of the new EU members.
5 Zeynep Elburz, Peter Nijkamp and Eric Pels, ‘Public infrastructure and regional growth: Lessons from 
meta-analyses’, Journal of Transport and Geography no 58 (2017),  1–8.
6 Pavle Petrović, Milojko Arsić and Aleksandra Nojković, ‘Increasing public investment can be an effec-
tive policy in bad times’, Economic Modelling  94 (2021),  580–597.
7 Nebojša Stojčić, Zoran Aralica and Ivan-Damir Anić, ‘Spatio-temporal determinants of the structural 
and productive transformation of regions in Central and East European countries’, Economic Systems 
 43, no 3 (2019),  100715–100726.
8 Daniel Albalate and Germà Bel and Xavier Fageda, ‘When supply travels far beyond demand: Oversup-
ply in Spain’s Transport Infrastructure’, Transport Policy  41 (2015),  80–89.
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First of all, we have to check if the two statements in the hypothesis are valid, namely 
if investments in transport in new member states were really higher than in the 
other EU countries, further: if GDP growth of new member states exceeded the EU 
average. There is a focus on the construction of transport infrastructure, but broader 
categories of investments related to transport are identified as well. Euro values and 
quantities expressed in physical units are presented. As for GDP growth, nominal, 
real and purchasing power parity (PPP) values are considered, paying attention to the 
role of prices.
Investments appear in national accounts as gross fixed capital formation. Transport 
related investments are gross fixed investments of the transport industry and gross fixed 
investments of general government in transport. It is also worth checking gross fixed 
capital formation by asset type with special regard to construction other than dwellings 
and transport equipment. Crowding-in effect may be assumed if investments are not 
related directly to transport growth. The question is the share of the CEE11 countries 
within the EU in such investments has increased. Still, this is not enough; a lasting shift 
of capital formation towards this region should be proven.
Productivity improvement of the transport sector should lead to higher revenue 
efficiency reflected in higher increase of gross value added compared to the increase of 
the output of the transport industry. Productivity improvement of other sectors should 
mean increasing cost efficiency mirrored in the decreasing quotient of the total use of 
transport services per total less transport gross value added.
Consumption pattern of households shows the transportation effects of growing 
welfare in spending more on travel. A substantial increase in the number of personal 
cars on the roads is not only a sign of welfare but also creates bottlenecks deteriorating 
the effectiveness of transport services. People spending more on passenger transport 
services also give a feedback on higher quality (comfort, speed).
The source of data where not mentioned otherwise is Eurostat. Eurostat itself is 
forced to replace missing data with its own estimates; some own estimates are used in 
this paper as well. Because of the lack of full data series for all the countries, and with 
regard to the relatively simple hypothesis, complex statistical methods of comparison 
were not used here.
The year  2020 is a turning point both because of the consequences of the pandemic 
influencing the innovations of the  2021–2027 multiannual financial framework of the 
European Union. The breakthrough of new technologies (internet of things, artificial 
intelligence,  3D printing etc.) also put transportation in a  new context. It is early to 
estimate the exact effects of transport related new phenomena on supply and demand, 
but we can at least identify some of the trend changing factors.
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Based on the available data, the new EU members’ tendency of catching up in terms of 
transport infrastructure and economic output can be proven, but only a  limited role 
of improvements in transport causing economic growth can be underpinned. The data 
available and the methodology chosen are insufficient to prove or traverse underlying 
crowding-in and productivity effects. Central and Eastern European consumers’ attitude 
generally does not support the sustainability of the development of transport.
The hypothesis is based in the assumption that new members invest more in trans-
port and they have a higher economic growth. The second statement is easily proved by 
GDP data be it in current prices or PPS. As presented in Figure  1, the share of the eleven 
Central and Eastern European new members in the GDP of today’s EU (EU27) in current 
market prices was  9.0 per cent in  2010 and  10.6 per cent in  2019, rising continuously. In 
purchasing power standards this share has grown from  15.0 per cent to  16.9 per cent. 
Since the share of these CEE11  countries within the EU27  population has shrunk to 
 22.9 per cent by  2019, the trend of the  2010s shows a convergence of new members’ GDP 







2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Market prices PPS Population
Figure  1
Share of the CEE11 in the EU27 GDP and population
Source: Compiled by the author based on Eurostat.9
9 https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=nama_10_gdp&lang=en and https://apps 
so.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=demo_gind&lang=en
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2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Market prices PPS
Figure  2
The CEE11 GDP per capita; percentage of the EU27
Source: Compiled by the author based on Eurostat.10
Statistics on transport investments also shows a growing share of new members, but the 
definition of transport investments is less trivial. Gross fixed capital formation of the 
transport industry is part of this; member states except for Croatia and Cyprus provide 
GFCF data (Figure  3). The share of the CEE10 (without Croatia) in the EU25 (EU27 minus 
the two countries not providing data) grew from  14.4 per cent in  2010 to  17.0 per cent in 
 2015, but from  2016 this share has been lower again. Even so, the share of gross capital 
formation of the transport industry has remained above  2 per cent in the CEE10, while 
it has not been higher than  1.5 per cent in the EU25.
10 Based on the same dataset as Figure  1.
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2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
EU25 in GDP CEE10 in GDP CEE10/CEE25
Figure  3
Gross fixed capital formation of transport and storage; share in GDP, the CEE10 share in the EU25
Source: Compiled by the author based on Eurostat.11
Transport investments do not always appear in the accounts of transportation com-
panies. Gross fixed capital formation by assets gives another approach. Investment in 
infrastructure falls in the category of other buildings and structures (construction minus 
dwellings). This category is broader than investments in transport infrastructure. The 
CEE10 (no data for Croatia) countries had a  13.6 per cent share within the EU26 (without 
Croatia) in  2010, and  15.1 per cent in  2019, with an uneven growth between. In the case 
of the other relevant asset: transport equipment, the CEE10 share in  2010 was  9.9 per 
cent and  10.7 per cent in  2019, in certain years it was even higher (Figure  4). Gross fixed 
capital formation in the general government expenditure by function data also reflect 
a high of the CEE11 share under the transport function (included in Figure  4).
11 https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=nama_10_gdp&lang=en and https://apps 
so.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=nama_10_a64_p5&lang=en; missing data estimated 
extrapolating the previous five years’ average nominal change.
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2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Asset type: other buildings and structures (CEE10/EU26)
Asset type: transport equipment (CEE10/EU26)
General goverment expenditure on fixed assets (CEE11/EU27)
Figure  4
Gross fixed capital formation by asset type; government expenditure on fixed assets
Source: Compiled by the author based on Eurostat.12
CE Delft has collected transport infrastructure investment, operation, and maintenance 
expenditure data from a  huge number of sources for the period  1995–2016.13 They 
also found data for the CEE11 proportionally high values for the last decade, even the 
expenditures in Euros per inhabitant has been over the EU average. All sources show 
that investments in the CEE transport were near the level of the  2010s already from 
 2007.
Summing up the above: the share of the Central and Eastern European new mem-
bers has been increasing, while several data series related to transport investment show 
a similar but less continuous tendency of growth regarding the CEE countries’ share in 
the European Union. The period of  2011–2015 can be identified with a high investment 
ratio in transport in the new member states. Apart from investment value discussed 
hitherto, some natural measures also demonstrate this. The rapid increase in the length 
of motorways, electrified and modernised railways can also be quantified in kilometres; 
the regional fleet of lorries (especially in Poland and in Romania) also has shown an 
impressive rise. Eurostat does not have the data for some old members complicating 
exact comparison.
12 https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=nama_10_an6&lang=en and https://apps 
so.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=gov_10a_exp&lang=en
13 Arno Schroten, Lisanne van Wijngaarden, Marco Brambilla, Marco Gatto, Silvia Maffii, Frank Trosky, 
Holger Kramer, Reinhard Monden, Damaris Bertschmann, Maura Killer, Vitalie Lambla, Kareen El 
Beyrouty and Sofia Amaral, Overview of transport infrastructure expenditures and costs (European Com-
mission,  2019).
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Y Any further significant investments crowded in by transport investments would 
mean, they should be reflected by a rise of such investments lagging few years behind 
the rise of transport investments. What we find is a parallel tendency of investments in 
transport and other than transport. An immediate crowding-in effect is possible theoret-
ically; investors may base their decisions on information regarding future improvements 
of transport. But this does not seem to be the case. Capital formation in the new member 
states is determined by the EU transfers, the changes in capital formation follows the 
cycles in the EU budget programming. Both transport and other investments depend 
on EU funding. Although the CEE non-transport capital formation was higher than the 
EU average until  2015, from  2016, in all the other years, it has been under the average 
(Figure  5). No breakthrough in capital formation founding a base for catching up within 







2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
CEE10/EU25 CEE10 in GDP EU25 in GDP
Figure  5
Non-transport gross fixed capital formation
Source: Compiled by the author based on Eurostat.14
Improving productivity of transport services should lead to revenue efficiency: growing 
share of value added in output. This is only true for the period of  2011–2015  for the 
CEE11 region. Revenue efficiency of the CEE11 was higher than that of the EU27 between 
 2012 and  2017.
14 https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=nama_10_gdp&lang=en and https://apps 
so.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=nama_10_a64_p5&lang=en; missing data estimated 
extrapolating the previous five years’ average nominal change.
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2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
EU27 CEE11
Figure  6
Share of gross value added in transport output (transport revenue efficiency)
Source: Compiled by the author based on Eurostat.15
If the non-transport part of the economy gains efficiency through relatively cheaper 
transport services, this should be reflected in cost efficiency: decreasing inputs of 
transport services relative to aggregate gross value added less transport value added. 
Eurostat input–output tables are incomplete; especially data from  2017 are missing. 
Eurostat publishes estimates of the EU27  aggregates. According to these estimates 
there has not been any improvement of cost efficiency at the level of the European 
Union, rather some slight worsening (Figure  7). Very rough own estimates, extrapo-
lating tendencies of the years covered by Eurostat, give the opposite tendency: con-
tinuous improvement in the effective use of transport services in Central and Eastern 
European new member states.
15 https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=nama_10_a64_p5&lang=en; missing data 
estimated extrapolating the previous five years’ average nominal change.
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2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
EU27 CEE11
Figure  7
Use of transport services in non-transport gross value added (transport cost efficiency)
Source: Compiled by the author based on Eurostat.16
The above findings are not supported by a different methodology better based on data. 
The share of transportation and storage within the gross value added of today’s Euro-
pean Union (EU27) has been constantly  5 per cent (4.9 per cent in  2011 and  5.1 per cent 
in  2015, see Figure  8) throughout the  2010s while gross value added has permanently 
grown (except for a slight annual drop in  2012). The proportionally growing consump-
tion of households (Figure  9) implies a decreasing share of intermediate consumption, 
so Eurostat’s use (input) estimates are in contradiction with other, complete data sets. 
The share of transport within value added has grown in Central and Eastern Europe 
while the share in consumption has decreased. The picture based on gross value added 
and consumption statistics does not support the findings based on the fragmented data 
of input–output tables.
16 https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=nama_10_a64_p5&lang=en, https://appsso.
eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=naio_10_cp1610&lang=en; missing data estimated with 
various methods.
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2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
EU27 CEE11
Figure  8
Share of transport and storage in gross value added
Source: Compiled by the author based on Eurostat.17
Consumption patterns worth further analysis, increasing welfare enables more con-
sumption in the field of transportation. The share of transport services in consumption 
has grown from  2.0 per cent to  2.2 per cent between  2010 and  2019, purchase and opera-
tion of vehicles made  10.8 per cent of consumption both in  2010 and  2019, and there was 
a slight increase package holidays (from  1.0 per cent to  1.1 per cent). The consumption 
patterns of the CEE11 countries are different from the EU average. The share of trans-
port services dropped after  2015 after a period of convergence to the EU average, while 
purchase and operation of vehicles increased from  9.0 per cent to  10.0 per cent between 
 2010 and  2019. Operation of vehicles made a  6.1 per cent in  2010,  7.0 per cent (reaching 
the EU average) in  2018.  In this group of countries welfare effects focus more on the 
purchase of passenger cars, fuel the expansion of transportation and holiday services 
less. Romania is an exception with a clear relative growth of consumption of transport 
services (1.9 per cent to  3.1 per cent), decreasing expenses on vehicles (8.9 per cent to 
 7.6 per cent) and a slight drop of value added by transportation and storage (7.1 per cent 
to  6.8 per cent) indicating a sound role of a developing transport sector in gaining effi-
ciency and contributing to welfare.
17 https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=nama_10_a64_p5&lang=en and https://
appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=nama_10_gdp&lang=en
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2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
EU27 Purchase of vehicles CEE11 Purchase of vehicles
EU27 Operation of vehicles CEE11 Operation of vehicles
EU27 Transport CEE11 Transport
EU27 Package holidays CEE11 Package holidays
Figure  9
Transport related consumption of households
Source: Compiled by the author based on Eurostat.18
The focus on passenger cars in Central and Eastern European consumption has contrib-
uted to a substantial increase of the number cars, creating bottlenecks in the roads. By 
 2018, the number of passenger cars19 per  10 inhabitants increased in the CEE11 from 
 3.7 (year  2010) to  4.9  in contrast to the EU27 (members today) from  4.8 to  5.3. Con-
sumption patterns also tell us much about the negative environmental externalities of 
this increase in car stock. As can been seen in Figure  9, the CEE11 people spend sub-
stantially less on buying more cars. This reflects cheaper, mainly used cars. Convergence 
in operating costs also suggest cars with higher fuel consumption thus more pollution.
6. Discussion
As the research by CE Delft demonstrates, the CEE11 countries in the EU could invest in 
transport infrastructure more four times (the EU28 countries one and a half times) of 
their  1995 level between  2008 and  2011.20 This paper approaches investment in transport 
in a broader sense and uses different data sources indicating record high levels through-
out the first half of the  2010s. Several authors, like Ákos Kengyel point out that less EU 
transfers for transport development were available in the period  2014–2020 compared 
18 https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=nama_10_co3_p3&lang=en
19 https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=road_eqs_carhab&lang=en
20 Schroten et al., Overview of transport infrastructure expenditures and costs.
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to  2007–2013.21 All data series examined above underpin that transport related invest-
ments in new member states had been over the EU average until  2015. This corresponds 
with the  2007–2013 multiannual financial frameworks (regarding that payments were 
due by year ‘n +  2’). Data for the years  2016  and after do not show the continuity of 
tendencies of the first half of the decade. At the same time, catching up in terms of GDP 
even accelerated slightly. Theoretically investments of the first half of the decade my 
influence the growth of the second half of the decade.
One of the proofs of such an effect could be investments (other than in transport) 
crowded in. Our above analysis has shown that non-transport investments of the 
CEE11 countries were above the EU average just until  2015 coinciding with the boom of 
transport investments and remained under average since  2016. Locally, several crowd-
ing-in cases may be found not influencing the overall picture of the region. An analysis of 
FDI flows and case studies of foreign investments may convince us that better accessibil-
ity attracts foreign investors, but aggregate gross fixed capital formation do not reflect 
this at the CEE11 level. It is much more evident that the EU transfers to new members 
boosted transport and non-transport investments by  2015, overtaking old members, 
but this did not have substantial leverage on aggregate investment activities after  2016.
Further argument supporting growth effects of transport investments can be some 
evidence of increasing productivity of transport services. Gross value added increas-
ing faster than output between  2011  and  2015  in the CEE11  and between  2012  and 
 2016 EU-wide, can be linked to such a phenomenon. It needs further examination what 
has happened in the second half of the decade with transport companies in Central and 
Eastern Europe. Transport and storage services output has grown even faster than in the 
first half, but the increase of costs has outpaced the rapid growth of income. An analysis 
of these costs may bring us closer to longer term productivity issues of these companies.
The third direction of approbation of the linkage between transport investments 
and economic growth was the search of productivity gains of non-transport companies 
through more effective use of transport services. The shortcomings of input–output 
tables available limit us to conclude, especially for the years after  2016, still a decreasing 
use (input) of transport services can be revealed in the case of Central and Eastern Euro-
pean economies. Another method, comparing the share of transport in value added and 
the share of transport in the consumption of households makes a mending tendency of 
effective use of transport services likely at the EU27 level. Further research can explain 
contradicting results of these two methods, and the fast rise of transport services export 
surplus of the CEE11 can be considered in further analyses of productivity effects in East 
and West.
The consumption pattern of the CEE11 countries and the rapid growth of vehicle 
stock are not encouraging regarding sustainability. Romania may seem as an exception, 
but there the high number of Romanian citizens working in distant countries create 
demand also within Romania (for transport services) while they buy and operate their 
cars abroad.
21 Ákos Kengyel, ‘Közlekedéspolitika’, in Európai Uniós politikák, ed. by Ákos Kengyel (Budapest: 
Akadémiai Kiadó,  2020).
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Y As we have learned from the literature, more developed countries have less chance to 
boost economic growth through transport investments. Even if productivity effects can 
be detected both at the EU27  level and among the new members, theory and evidence 
(from the U.S.) teaches us to expect decreasing marginal factor productivity of transport 
investments. As the Polish Institute for Structural Research quantified it, ‘old’ members 
benefit from the EU transfers to new member states in a large extent.22 This is also a reason 
not to expect catching up of the CEE11 countries based on the EU funded investments.
The future development of these networks depends on the availability of the 
EU funds. The level of direct transfers will further decrease, while new members will 
better access debt-creating financial sources. The Multiannual Financial Framework 
for  2021–2027 does not provide the level of funding for new members as before. The 
extension of the MFF by the Next Generation EU tool (creating debt for members and 
the EU as a whole) and an increasing activity of the EIB enables most of the EU members, 
including the CEE countries, to expect similar financial flows towards transport from 
the EU in the first half of the  2020s compared to the  2010s. A game changing new wave 
of transport investments including high-speed railways seems to be more realistic to 
expect in  2030s. Corinne Blanquart and Martin Koning remind us that such huge invest-
ments need especially thorough consideration of costs and benefits.23
Not only the expansion of transport networks, but demand for it, too, may be at 
a  lower level compared to the  2010s. People began to travel significantly less during 
the Covid-19  crisis. Home office and video conferences become a  standard of several 
companies surviving the crisis; tourism may need several years to regain momentum. 
Industry  4.0  with digitalisation,  3D printing and other smart solutions may reshape 
the need for transport as well. In the world of artificial intelligence,  5G and internet of 
things, secure just in time communication between devices may need an increasing level 
of investments, while traditional investments in infrastructure like motorways may lose 
in importance.
It is not just a  ‘dictate from Brussels’ to direct relatively less funds for transport 
infrastructure and focus more on sustainability and digitalisation. As Stojčić, Aralica 
and Anić have found, an analysis of regional development at NUTS2 level underpins the 
need for infrastructure, first of all digital infrastructure to be accompanied by knowl-
edge transfers secured by direct investments and education.24
In the  2010s, labour force mobility from the CEE countries to the Western part of 
the EU25 also gave impetus to demand for transport. No new wave of labour migration 
like  10 years ago is not to be expected. The Covid-19 crisis split many families for months. 
More of them might return to the CEE countries than leave their home country for good.
22 Piotr Bartkiewicz, Anna Matejczuk, Henryk Kalinowski, Magdalena Ośka, Andrzej Regulski and Julian 
Zawistowski, How do EU-15 Member States Benefit from Cohesion Policy in the V4? (Instytut Badań 
Strukturalnych,  2016).
23 Corinne Blanquart and Martin Koning, ‘The local economic impacts of high-speed railways: theories 
and facts’ European Transport Research Review  9, no 12 (2017),  1–14.
24 Stojčić et al., ‘Spatio-temporal determinants’.
25 For the extent of migration see Martin Kahanec and Klaus F Zimmermann, ‘Post-Enlargement Migra-
tion and the Great Recession in the E(M)U: Lessons and policy implications’, Maastricht University 
UNU-MERIT Working Paper Series no 66 (2016),  1–34.
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During the  2010s, Central and Eastern European members of the European Union 
have converged successfully towards the average GDP of today’s EU, reaching the level 
of Greece, Portugal, and Spain. If this tendency continues, by  2030  most of the new 
members might have a GDP lagging not much behind the EU average. In the first half 
of the  2010s, the level of transport investments in the CEE11 was proportionally over 
the EU average. Since  2016 this level has been still higher than in the previous decades 
but has converged to the level of other EU members. Keeping transport investments 
proportionally over the EU average level in the  2020s will depend on their readiness to 
finance it increasingly by debt creation.
It is a common perception among politicians that investment in transport infra-
structure bolsters up economic growth. If the short construction sector gets an impetus, 
in the mid-term, companies around new infrastructure gain in efficiency, welfare of 
local people increases. Scholars more and more often point on the limits of such effects, 
especially in the case of developed countries. In Europe, Spain has overtaken all others 
in the length of motorways and high-speed train network while the purchasing power of 
their GDP has sunk recently.
For the EU as a whole, the  2010s was a period of increasing investments in trans-
port infrastructure and period of economic growth that can be linked by reason. The 
CEE countries were a main target of such investments and enjoyed GDP growth over 
the average of the EU. The above analysis has shown that both efficiency effects and 
welfare effects related to the improvement of transport services through investments 
are limited.
Theory still owes a clear answer if transport infrastructure development causes eco-
nomic growth or vice versa. The developments of the  2010s have given us some evidence 
that infrastructure may have helped growth; the  2020s might be a time for the EU to 
accumulate strength and prepare a comprehensive plan for transport of the future. For 
Central Europe, the  2020s should be a time for overcoming bottlenecks and completing 
routes interconnecting the countries of the region with each other and with the Western 
part of the EU.
In the  2020s relatively less investment in transport infrastructure, and lower 
transport infrastructure development related growth effects can be expected. In the 
meantime, this decade may be suitable to rethink transport needs for Europe of  2030s. 
Some major projects like a high-speed railway network extended to the Eastern part of 
Europe might bring a new wave of transport related growth, if planned properly.
Transport development is not a magic tool in catching up. Getting rid of the main 
obstacles, organising better access to resources and markets helps in reaching a higher 
income level, but skilled human resources, innovation, and effective organisation are the 
key. The inevitable infrastructure of the next decade is digital infrastructure. Challenges 
around energy supply should not be overseen either. Central Europe may become com-
petitive with today’s motorways and airports, too. High speed trains will get their roles 
in the decades of the  2030s and  2040s.
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